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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jesse Scott Cornelison appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation and ordering execution of a reduced sentence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2005, the state charged Cornelison with burglary and petit theft after he
stole a number of items from Larry and Mary's Restaurant.

(R., pp.11-12.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Cornelison pled guilty to burglary and the state
agreed to recommend a suspended unified five-year sentence and dismiss the
petit theft charge. (R., P.17.) The agreement also allowed Cornelison to request
a withheld judgment without objection from the state.

(R., p.17.)

The court

subsequently entered an order withholding judgment and placing Cornelison on
probation for three years. (R., pp.23-32.)
Approximately eight months later, the state filed a motion to revoke
probation, alleging Cornelison violated his probation by failing to attend
treatment, failing to report to his probation officer, and smoking marijuana. (R.,
pp.41-45.) On March 3, 2006, Cornelison admitted violating his probation (R.,
p.49), and, on March 21, 2006, the court revoked Cornelison's withheld judgment
and imposed a unified fiVe-year sentence with two years fixed and retained
jurisdiction (R., pp.54-58). At the end of the retained jurisdiction review period,
the court again placed Cornelison on probation. (R., pp.63-71.)
Just over eight months later, the state filed a second motion to revoke
probation based on allegations that Cornelison violated his probation by being

1

driving under the influence, leaving the scene of an

accident,

privileges. (R., pp.73-77.) Two

an

to revoke Cornelison's probation adding
Cornelison violated

allegation that

probation by consuming alcohol and

evidentiary test requested by his probation officer.

to take an

(R., p.80.)

Cornelison

admitted violating his probation by consuming alcohol and the state withdrew the
remaining allegation regarding Cornelison's criminal charges, electing to pursue
those solely in a separate criminal case. (R., p.86.) On June
revoked Cornelison's probation and retained jurisdiction (R.,

, 2007, the court
.91-95), after

which the court placed Cornelison on probation once again (R., pp.100-107).
Two months after Cornelison was placed on probation for a third time, the
state filed another motion to revoke probation alleging Cornelison moved without
permission from his probation officer and failed to provide a "daily intox." (R.,
pp.109-113.) On January 15, 2008, Cornelison admitted the alleged violations
and the state agreed to "OR release" and to continue disposition for six months.
,p.117.)

At the July 8, 2008 disposition hearing, the parties jointly

recommended continuing Cornelison on probation, and, on July 8, 2008, the
court reinstated Cornelison's probation. (R., pp.119-129.)
On November 16, 2011, the state filed its fourth motion to revoke
probation.

CR., p.131.)

The report of violation alleged Cornelison violated his

probation by being charged with failing to provide proof of insurance, failing to
to his probation officer, testing positive for marijuana, and failing to pay the
supervision.

(R., pp.132-135.)

2

Cornelison admitted violating his

probation after which the court revoked his probation and ordered his sentence
executed, but reduced the sentence to four years with one year fixed.

(R.,

pp.137-143.) Cornelison filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's
January 10, 2012 Order on Motion to Revoke Probation. (R., pp.145-147.)

3

ISSUES
issues on appeal as:
Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Cornelison
and equal protection when it denied his Motion
Augment with the requested transcripts?
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Cornelison's probation?
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed
reduce Mr. Cornelison's sentence sua sponte upon revoking
probation?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Cornelison failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated
his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record
with eight irrelevant transcripts?
2.
Has Cornelison failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by
either revoking probation or failing to further reduce his sentence upon doing so?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

Cornelison Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record
With Eight Irrelevant Transcripts
A.

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Cornelison filed a motion to

augment with eight as-yet unprepared transcripts. (Motion To Augment And To
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed June
28, 2012 (hereinafter "Motion").)

The requested transcripts include (1) the

admit/deny hearings held on March 2, 2006, June 5, 2007, and January 15,
2008; (2) the disposition/sentencing hearings held on March 21, 2006, June 26,
2007, and July 8, 2008; and (3) the "rider review hearing[s]" held on August 29,
2006, and October 30, 2007. (Motion, pp.1-2.) The state filed an objection to
Cornelison's Motion, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied the motion as to all
requested transcripts.

(Order, dated July 9, 2012.) Cornelison now contends

that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with the requested
transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection and has denied him effective assistance of counsel
on appeal.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-17.)

Cornelison has failed to establish a

violation of his constitutional rights because he has failed to show that the
requested transcripts are even relevant to, much less necessary for resolution of,
the only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal.

5

Standard Of Review
to constitutional issues is one
unless they are clearly erroneous, but

deference

requirements have been satisfied in light of the

review

39 Idaho 375, 380, 79

facts found.
2003); State v. Smith, 1

C.

3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.

Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

Should This Case Be Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals,
Cornelison Has Failed To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider
The Idaho Supreme Court's Order Denying His Motion To Augment;
Alternatively, Cornelison's Constitutional Arguments Fail
In State v. Morgan, 2012 WL 2782599 (Idaho App. July 10, 2012), the

Idaho Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied
the appellant his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the
record on appeal with various transcripts. In doing so the Court "disclaim[ed] any
authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision
made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of
Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the
state or federal constitutions or other law." Morgan at * 2. Such an undertaking,
the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining
an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the
purview of this Court."
. . to evaluate and

kL

The Court, however, "deem[ed] it within [its] authority.

on [a] renewed motion" if, for example, "the completed

appellant's brief and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or expanded
issues on appeal

a

as to dernonstrate the need

6

additional records

or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support a renewed motion."

kL

To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Cornelison's

arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho
Supreme Court's order denying his motion to augment the record with eight
transcripts that are unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal.

Even if this

Court considers the merits of Cornelison's claim, all of his arguments fail.
As in Morgan, Cornelison argues that he is entitled to the additional
transcripts because, he claims, the failure to provide them is a violation of his
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and the effective assistance
of appellate counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-17.) As an initial matter, the state
agrees with the Court's skepticism, expressed in Morgan, that these arguments
constitute "new information or justification for [Cornelison's] motion to augment
the record."

Morgan at 2.

Nevertheless, even "assuming arguendo that the

arguments ... may be properly entertained by this Court as a renewed motion to
augment the record," the arguments lack merit.

kL

As noted in Morgan, "A

defendant in a criminal case only has a due process right to a record on appeal
that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the
proceedings below."

kL

at *2 (citing cases, internal quotations omitted.)

Cornelison's appeal is timely only from the district court's January 10, 2012
revocation order. The transcripts of the proceedings related to that revocation
decision are included in the record on appeal and are more than adequate to
evaluate the district court's decision. (See generally 11/22/2011 Tr. (admit/deny
hearing), 12/13/2011 Tr. (evidentiary/plea), 1/10/2012 Tr. (disposition).)

7

court in reaching its decision is

the information cited
contained in the

12

violation

Cornelison's history on probation)

recommendations).)

and minutes reflecting
also contains all of the presentence
) Cornelison's claim that
nC>1,,,,,;;;,,,:.n

L.1 - p.28, L.1

The

prepared in Cornelison's case.
transcripts of hearings that occurred

2006 and 2008 are necessary to address the district court's revocation
in 2012 fail. See Morgan at

Contrary to Cornelison's claim, State

v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), does not hold otherwise.
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)
In Hanington, the Court stated that, in reviewing a sentence that is ordered
into execution following a period of probation, the Court "will examine the entire
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment" and review
is based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of
probation." Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. According to Cornelison,
this language from Hanington requires augmentation with transcripts of all
hearings from sentencing to the final revocation. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) The
Court in Morgan, however, held that this interpretation of Hanington is too broad.
Morgan at *3.

The Court clarified that although it "will not arbitrarily confine

[itself] to only those facts which arise
revocation of probation ... that does

sentencing to the time of the
mean that all proceedings in the trial

court up to and including sentencing are germane."
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Id. (emphasis original).

Rather, "[tJhe focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's
decision to revoke probation."

kl

Accordingly, the Court "will consider the

elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of
probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal.,,1

kl

Cornelison was afforded all the process he was due in relation to the
preparation of the appellate record before the record was settled. As noted in
Morgan, "The parties to an appeal have twenty-eight days from the service of the
record to request additions or corrections to the record.

Idaho appellate Rule

1 Cornelison also relies on State v. Warren, 123 Idaho 20,843 P.2d 170 (Ct. App.
1992), as U[fJurther support" for his position. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14.)
Cornelison's reliance on Warren is misplaced. Warren was placed on probation
following an aggravated battery conviction. Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at
171. Two years later, Warren was charged with a new crime and his probation
was revoked in his aggravated battery case, but his sentence was reduced. kl
Despite the reduction, Warren filed a Rule 35 motion, which was denied. kl On
appeal, Warren challenged the denial of his Rule 35 motion in the aggravated
battery case. In addressing this claim, the Court of Appeals noted the absence
of either a presentence report or a transcript from the sentencing hearing in the
aggravated battery case and concluded that "[w]ithout a more complete record
and no argument by Warren as to why the sentence was unreasonable," there
was no support for Warren's claim that the district court abused its discretion in
relation to the sentence reduction or the denial of Rule 35 relief. kl Cornelison
argues that Warren supports his position that he is entitled to the requested
transcripts because the Court will "not address the merits of his sentence
reduction claim" without them. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) This argument reflects
either a misrepresentation or a misunderstanding of Warren as the Court in
Warren clearly addressed the sentencing claim before it, but affirmed due to the
lack of a "more complete record" or "argument by Warren as to why the sentence
was unreasonable." Warren, 123 Idaho at 21, 843 P.2d at 171. Cornelison also
claims "the Warren opinion indicates that [the lack of transcripts] would be
presumed to support the district court's decision to execute the original
sentence." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) However, nowhere in Warren did the Court
state that missing portions of the record were presumed to support the district
court's opinion. Moreover, the Court in Morgan expressly rejected the idea that
missing portions of the record would be presumed to support a district court's
revocation decision when those transcripts were not before it at the time of the
disposition hearing. Morgan at *3.
9

29(a)." Morgan

*3. "[Cornelison] was

not only the
inclusion in the
[Cornelison] was

to

, but
on appeal.
designate

the process by

documents in the record necessary for appeal .... " Id.
rules also
settled clerk's record,
For these reasons, the
by Cornelison, that

a party may move the Supreme Court to add to the
therein creates a right to such augmentation."
rt of Appeals has rejected the proposition, advanced
ability to designate records necessary for

review under I.A.R. 28 [is] insufficient to afford due process."

kL

The Court in Morgan also rejected the argument that equal protection
mandates augmentation of all transcripts the appellant desires, stating:
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency.
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.A.R. 29(a). Morgan's
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to
augment the record, precluded him from including the first
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant,
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested.
Morgan at *4. Cornelison's equal proiection claim fails for the same reasons.
Finally, the Court in Morgan atso rejected the assertion that the denial of a
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the
assistance of counsel.

Morgan at *4.

Cornelison, like Morgan,

demonstrate how effective assistance of counsel is not

10

failed to
the

requested transcripts."

kL.

Cornelison's "speculation that the requested

transcripts 'might' bear upon the district court's revocation of probation is not
sufficient to establish he cannot effectively be counseled."

kL.

Thus, Cornelison

"has not shown that the requested transcripts are necessary for counsel to
provide effective assistance regarding the issue raised in this appeaL"
While Cornelison acknowledges that Morgan "does directly deal with the
issues raised in this appeal," he argues, "at this point this case is not final."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.)

Although Morgan is not final, it is nevertheless

persuasive authority that Cornelison's claims lack merit.
In addition to noting that Morgan is not final, Cornelison also argues his
case is distinguishable because he "is challenging not only the order revoking
probation, but also the length of his sentence, which entails an analysis of the
district court's sentencing rationale." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) This distinction,
even if meaningful, which the state does not concede,2 has no relevance to the
transcripts Cornelison claims should have been augmented to the record. The
transcript of Cornelison's original sentencing hearing is already included in the
record. (6/28/2005 Tr.) Moreover, as discussed in Section II, infra, Cornelison's
sentencing argument is that the court should have further reduced his sentence
upon revocation.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20.) It is unclear why the transcript

reflecting the court's decision to reduce Cornelison's sentence is not adequate to
review whether the court should have further reduced the sentence.

2 For example, while a district court is encouraged to articulate its "sentencing
rationale," it is not required to do so, and the appellate court may review the
sentence regardless. State v. Osborn, 104 Idaho 809,810,663 P.2d 1111,1112
(1983).
11

All of Cornelison's claims

the

of his

record fail.

Introduction
After Cornelison's fourth unsuccessful stint on probation, the
revoked probation and ordered Cornelison's sentence executed, but reduced the
sentence from five years, with two years

, to four years, with one year fixed.

On appeal, Cornelison "concedes that he violated the terms of his probation" but
asserts that "[e]ven though [he] was struggling with probation, there was a
consensus between the parties that revocation of probation was not warranted."
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Cornelison also argues that the district court abused its
discretion by not "further" reducing his sentence upon revocation in light of the
"various mitigating factors present in this matter." (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20.)
Both of these arguments fail to establish an abuse of discretion.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v.
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).

12

C.

Cornelison Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Revoking His Probation
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on

appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty,
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994).

An abuse of

discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason.

~

"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho
506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether
the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued
probation is consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525,
529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001).

Any cause satisfactory to the court,

which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify
revocation. Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510,903 P.2d at 99. Contrary to Cornelison's
assertions on appeal, a review of the record shows the district court did not
abuse its discretion in revoking Cornelison's probation.
The record

reflects, and Cornelison concedes, that he repeatedly

struggled with the requirements of probation and was given several opportunities
to demonstrate that he could successfully complete a probationary period, but he
never did. (See generally R.) As noted by the district court, probation "ha[d] not
met its intended goal, which is that of rehabilitation." (1/10/2012 Tr., p.28, Ls.6-7;
see also p.28, LS.17 -19.) This conclusion, and the related revocation decision,
does not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Wilson, supra.
13

Cornelison argues otherwise, claiming "there was a consensus

instead impose "1
release. (Appellant's Brief,

" and

in

that revocation of probation was not
days of county jail

18.) Although the second

the option
of Cornelison's

argument accurately reflects the recommendation of the parties, the first part of
argument is not only incorrect, it would be inconsistent with the parties'
recommendation. At the disposition hearing, the prosecutor asked the court to
"consider commuting [Cornelison's] sentence to a period of a local incarceration,"
specifically "180 days county jail" with no objection to work release. (1/10/2012
Tr., p.24, LsA-9.) Cornelison also asked the court to commute his sentence to
"county jail time," but stated his preference for a "shorter period of time" with work
release.

(1/10/2012 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-4.)

Cornelison's claim that there was a

"consensus between the parties that revocation of probation was not warranted"
is not only factually inaccurate, it is legally inconsistent with the actual
recommendation.

The court would obviously have to revoke Cornelison's

probation in order to execute a commuted sentence of local jail time.
In any event, the district court rejected the parties' recommendation
because it would not serve the purpose of what the court was trying to
accomplish in the first place, i.e., rehabilitation.

(1/10/2012 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-7.)

The court wanted to be sure Cornelison received "additional programming,"
which would "not be available" to Cornelison if he were in jail. (1/10/2012 Tr.,
p.28, Ls.8-11.) The court also specifically considered another "mitigating factor"
upon by Cornelison on appeal; namely, Cornelison's "family needs."

14

(Appellant's Brief, p.1S.)

The court stated:

"While I understand that the

defendant has obligations to his family, certainly, those obligations were not so
important to the defendant as to compel him to comply with the terms of th[e]
court's allowance of defendant to be released into the community." (1/10/2012
Tr., p.2S, Ls.11-16.)
That the court did not agree to the parties' commutation recommendation

or place Cornelison's "family needs" above Cornelison's need for "additional
programming" does not establish an abuse of discretion. Cornelison has failed to
show otherwise.

D.

Cornelison Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Not Further Reducing His Sentence Upon Revocation
Cornelison asserts the district court abused its discretion when it failed to

further reduce his sentence upon revoking probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1920.) The record supports the district court's sentencing determination.
Upon revoking Cornelison's probation, the district court had the authority,
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, to sua sponte reduce the underlying
sentence imposed upon his conviction for grand theft.

I.C.R. 35; State v.

McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 400, 179 P.3d 360, 363 (Ct. App. 200S). The court
exercised this authority and reduced Cornelison's sentence.

Apparently

unsatisfied with the extent of the reduction, Cornelison argues the district court
abused its discretion by failing to "further" reduce his sentence given that "the
instant offense is [his] first felony," he has ADHD and family support, and he
claims to be remorseful. (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Cornelison also notes he had

15

a

performance[s]" in 2006 and 2007.

(Appellant's

compelled

charge Cornelison pled guilty
been

his criminal history as of that date
driving

the influence, driving a vehicle without the

purchase/consumption/possession of alcohol by a minor.

consent,
p.3.)

in 2005 may

Cornelison also continued to incur criminal charges while he was on

probation in this case. (See R., pp.73-77, 132-135.) None of the other
factors cited by Cornelison explain his criminal behavior, nor did they prevent him
from continuing to commit crimes. Cornelison's "positive rider performance[s]" in
2006 and 2007 also do not explain why his sentence should have been reduced
in 2012, much less "further" reduced.

State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430,438, 258

P.3d 950,958 (Ct. App. 2011) (State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137,30 P.3d
290, 292 (2001)) (an offender's "[glood performance while on retained
jurisdiction, though commendable, does not alone establish an abuse of
discretion in

district judge's decision not to grant probation"). If anything, the

fact that Cornelison demonstrated the ability to comply with rules only while
confined weighs in favor of the original sentence imposed; a reduction was just
another
This

leniency, among many, given to Cornelison by the district court.
far short of an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
orders revoking Day's probation and executing his sentence.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2012.

JES~ICA M. LORELLO
Deputw'Attorney General
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day of September, 2012, served
RESPONDENT
a

BUC
to be placed in The State
Court Clerk's

Defender's

18

located

the

